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TO SERVE AND PROTECT: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT
LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATION IN ILLINOIS
AND A CALL FOR REFORM
INTRODUCTION
Due to an increase in the number of individuals killed by law en-
forcement officers since 2010,1 and the increase in public awareness of
these events made possible by the proliferation of smart phone re-
cordings and other video recorded evidence,2 public perception is that
police misconduct is ever present.3  This perception has not only
deeply fractured the relationship between law enforcement officers
and the citizens they are tasked to protect,4 but is also highly problem-
atic because public trust in law enforcement and belief in its legiti-
macy are vital to maintaining an ordered, law-abiding society.5
Increased transparency within law enforcement agencies may restore
the legitimacy and the public’s trust of law enforcement.  One way to
achieve transparency is to increase the availability of objective evi-
dence of law enforcement’s interactions with the public by equipping
law enforcement officers with body cameras.  Objective recordings of
1. Expanded Homicide Data Table 14, FBI: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, https://
www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/offenses-known-to-
law-enforcement/expanded-homicide/expanded_homicide_data_table_14_justifiable_homicide_
by_weapon_law_enforcement_2009-2013.xls (last visited Aug. 15, 2016).
2. Michael Wines & Sarah Cohen, Police Killings Rise Slightly, Though Increased Focus May
Suggest Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/01/us/no-sharp-
rise-seen-in-police-killings-though-increased-focus-may-suggest-otherwise.html.  “[A]ny percep-
tion that higher numbers of unarmed African Americans are being killed by the police in recent
months is driven by citizens’ postings of unsettling cellphone videos and pictures, like that of
police officers dragging Freddie Gray, his legs apparently not working, into a van.” Id.
3. Id. (“[S]o many unarmed black males have died in police confrontations that even Presi-
dent Obama noted this week that ‘it comes up, it seems like, once a week now, or once every
couple of weeks.’”).
4. Susan Page, Poll: Whites and Blacks Question Police Accountability, USA TODAY (Aug.
26, 2014, 4:42 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/25/usa-today-pew-poll-
police-tactics-military-equipment/14561633 (“USA TODAY/Pew Research Center Poll finds
Americans by 2-to-1 say police departments nationwide don’t do a good job in holding officers
accountable for misconduct, treating racial groups equally and using the right amount of
force.”).
5. Loretta J. Stalans, Community Attitudes Toward the Police, in 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
POLICE SCIENCE 192 (Jack R. Greene ed., 3d ed. 2007).
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law enforcement officers’ interactions with the public are currently
lacking because of the Illinois eavesdropping statute.6
Illinois was once well known for having one of the strictest eaves-
dropping statutes in the United States.7  Most state statutes require
only one party’s consent for a recording to be lawful.8  However, Illi-
nois required the consent of all parties to a recording.9  For many
years, Illinois required the consent of all parties to a recording—even
in the context of a citizen recording their own public encounter with
law enforcement.10  In 2014, the Illinois eavesdropping statute was in-
validated on First Amendment grounds.11  The Illinois legislature re-
sponded and reformulated the eavesdropping statute in 2014.12
Additionally, in reacting to the recent nationwide outcry against po-
lice misconduct,13 the Illinois legislature amended the statute again in
2015.14  In addition to amending the eavesdropping statute, the Illinois
legislature passed the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera
Act (the Act),15 which merely regulates state law enforcement
agency’s use of police body cameras within the law enforcement agen-
cies that choose to use them; however, use of police body cameras is
not mandatory.16  Though the Illinois legislature made important pro-
gress in increasing transparency within law enforcement agencies
when it enacted these changes, the reforms do not go far enough.
Though the reforms under the Act are a step in the right direction,
these changes do not go far enough to thoroughly foster transparency
6. Eavesdropping, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1 to -9 (2014 & Supp. 2016).
7. Don Terry, Eavesdropping Laws Mean that Turning On an Audio Recorder Could Send
You to Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/us/23cnceaves
dropping.html?_r=0 (“[Two individuals] audio-recorded their separate nonviolent encounters
with Chicago police officers without the officers’ permission, a Class 1 felony in Illinois, which,
along with Massachusetts and Oregon, has one of the country’s toughest, if rarely prosecuted,
eavesdropping laws.”).
8. Civil Rights Law – Protection of Rights: Surveillance, Recording & Interception, in LEXIS-
NEXIS 50-STATE SURVEYS, STATUTES & REGULATIONS, LexisNexis (database updated June
2016).
9. Id.
10. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14 (2014), invalidated by Illinois v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, 6
N.E.3d 120, and Illinois v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, 6 N.E.3d 154.
11. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 25.
12. See S.B. 1342, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014).
13. Kim Geiger & Jeremy Gorner, Rauner Signs Police Body Camera Bill into Law, CHI.
TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2015, 6:06 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ctbrucerauner
policebodycamerabillmet071320150812story.html (“The legislation comes after a series of officer
involved deaths generated momentum behind a nationwide push for recording officer en-
counters with the public.”).
14. See S.B. 1304, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2015).
15. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 706/10-1 to -35 (2014 & Supp. 2016).
16. Id. § 10-15.
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in law enforcement.  Given the complexities of the Illinois eavesdrop-
ping statute discussed above and the history of prosecutions under the
law, citizens fear recording their interactions with law enforcement of-
ficers.  As a result, citizens often do not have available recordings of
their interactions with law enforcement when problems arise.  This
perpetuates the view that there is a lack of transparency in police and
community relations.  Compulsory use of body cameras by law en-
forcement officers in Illinois can bridge the gap left by the lack of
citizen recordings and can promote much needed transparency be-
tween police and the communities they serve.  Currently, very few
states have implemented comprehensive police body camera legisla-
tion.17  Thus, Illinois has the opportunity to be at the forefront of na-
tionwide change.
The transparency that cameras provide can reveal and reduce police
misconduct of all types, such as, abuse of power, brutality, excessive
use of deadly force, stealing, and more.  Thus, this Comment advo-
cates for mandatory implementation of police body cameras through-
out Illinois in order to restore public trust in law enforcement.  Part II
of this Comment discusses the background of (A) recent high profile
police misconduct in Illinois and in other states;18 (B) the challenges
presented by the Illinois eavesdropping statute that was in effect in
2013 and in prior years;19 (C) the United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit case ACLU v. Alvarez,20 which expressed concerns
regarding the validity of the Illinois eavesdropping statute in 2012;21
(D) the eventual invalidation of the Illinois eavesdropping statute by
the Illinois Supreme Court in 2014;22 (E) the Illinois legislature’s re-
sponse to this invalidation;23 (F) the Illinois legislature’s most recent
reforms made effective as of 2016, which respond to the current na-
tional crisis of deaths by the hands of law enforcement officers;24 and
(G) the regulatory compliance with the statute.25
Part III posits that current Illinois legislation may dissuade law en-
forcement agencies from initiating police body camera programs be-
cause the law makes police body camera programs optional, while
17. Michael Obrien, Police Body Cams—States Balance Privacy vs the Public’s Right to Know,
BILL TRACK 50 (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.billtrack50.com/blog/in-the-news/police-body
-cams/.
18. See infra notes 30–46 and accompanying text. R
19. See infra notes 47–73 and accompanying text. R
20. 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
21. See infra notes 74–87 and accompanying text. R
22. See infra notes 88–109 and accompanying text. R
23. See infra notes 110–16 and accompanying text. R
24. See infra notes 117–26 and accompanying text. R
25. See infra notes 127–49 and accompanying text. R
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imposing significant and costly regulations only on those law enforce-
ment agencies that choose to begin a program.26  Part III argues that
the legislation should instead mandate and fund police body camera
programs in order to achieve the legislature’s goal of increased trans-
parency in law enforcement.27  Part III also suggests that the costs of
mandating police body camera programs may be offset by savings
from deterring police misconduct and assisting in the exoneration of
police officers who are falsely accused, which would save millions of
tax dollars that would otherwise be spent investigating, defending, and
settling claims of police misconduct.28  Part IV emphasizes the effect
and importance of taking steps to restore public trust in law enforce-
ment because it promotes compliance with the law.29  Part V con-
cludes that only by amending the Act to mandate universal use of
officer-worn body cameras in Illinois will the goal of transparency in
law enforcement truly be achieved.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part examines several recent, high-profile instances of police
misconduct in Illinois and nationwide.  It then explains the recent
amendments to the Illinois eavesdropping statute and how the Illinois
eavesdropping statute affected recording government officials, such as
police officers.  Next, this Part explains the Illinois Supreme Court’s
eventual invalidation of the former Illinois eavesdropping statute and
provides the General Assembly’s amended statute.  Finally, this Part
examines the legislature’s enactment of the Act, which appears to be
in response to recent high-profile instances of police misconduct as
well as the uncertain parameters of the previous eavesdropping stat-
utes insofar as they regulated recording police officers.
A. Recent High-Profile Police Misconduct in Illinois
and Nationwide
Recent instances of police misconduct in Illinois, and throughout
the nation, underscore the need for reforms aimed at abating police
misconduct.30  These instances of police misconduct also demonstrate
the pivotal role that video footage serves in uncovering and resolving
26. See infra notes 150–57 and accompanying text. R
27. See infra notes 158–76 and accompanying text. R
28. See infra notes 177–205 and accompanying text. R
29. See infra notes 206–29 and accompanying text. R
30. See Sarah Freishtat, Protestors Rally to Raise Awareness of ‘Brutality of Police,’ CHI. TRIB.
(Oct. 3, 2015, 6:44 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ctcommunityre
newalsocietypolicerallymet20151003story.html.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-4\DPL402.txt unknown Seq: 5 21-SEP-17 7:28
2017] RECENT LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATION 1137
incidents of misconduct.31  On October 20, 2014, a Chicago police of-
ficer shot Laquan McDonald, a car burglary suspect, as he walked
away from police.32  The officer continued shooting even after criti-
cally injuring Mr. McDonald who lay motionless on the ground.33  Mr.
McDonald died as a result of the gunshot wounds.34  Dashboard cam-
eras mounted in police squad cards recorded the events preceding the
shooting and the shooting itself.35  Without dash camera footage, the
true circumstances surrounding the shooting might never have been
revealed.  Due in part to the availability of dash camera footage, the
Cook County State’s Attorney filed first-degree murder charges
against Officer Jason Van Dyke.36
Available video recording footage was also instrumental in discov-
ering the true circumstances that transpired in the death of Walter
Scott in South Carolina.  Police officer Michael Slager shot Mr. Scott
in the back as he was running away following a traffic stop for a bro-
ken brake light.37  The officer’s actions were out of view of his dash-
board camera.38  A concerned bystander captured the only existing
video footage with a cell phone.39  The bystander’s video footage
showed the officer shooting Mr. Scott, who was unarmed, eight times
in the back.40  Based largely in part on the availability of video record-
ing footage, a grand jury indicted Officer Michael Slager on murder
charges.41
Video footage recorded as part of a security system has also uncov-
ered police misconduct.  On July 31, 2013, Chicago police officers
31. Timeline: Eric Garner Death, NBC N.Y. (Dec. 5, 2014, 9:44 AM), http://www.nbcnewyork.
com/news/local/Timeline-Eric-Garner-Chokehold-Death-Arrest-NYPD-Grand-Jury-No-Indict
ment-284657081.html (discussing how bystander cell phone footage captured the true circum-
stances surrounding the death of Eric Garner as a result of an officer’s use of an illegal
chokehold).
32. Zusha Elinson & Dan Frosch, Cost of Police-Misconduct Cases Soars in Big U.S. Cities,
WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cost-of-police-misconduct-
cases-soars-in-big-u-s-cities-1437013834.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Alvarez Defends Herself, Mayor Emanuel in Timing of Charges in Laquan McDonald
Case, NBC CHI. (Nov. 24, 2015, 3:20 PM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/Alva
rez-Opponents-Question-Timeline-of-Release-of-McDonald-Video-353183351.html.
37. Dana Ford, South Carolina Ex-Police Officer Indicted in Walter Scott Killing, CNN (June
8, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/08/us/south-carolina-slager-indictment-walter-
scott.
38. Id. (“Dash cam video from that stop shows the two men talking before Scott gets out of
the car and runs.  Slager gives chase.  They run out of range of the dash cam.”).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. “If convicted of murder, the former officer could face up to life in prison.” Id.
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raided the tanning salon business of Jessica Klyzek for suspected pros-
titution services.42  During the raid, police officers hurled racially
charged expletives and epithets at the woman, and struck her even
after she was handcuffed in a kneeling position.43  The law enforce-
ment officers did not realize they were being filmed at the time, and it
was not until after the beating that the officers discovered that the
salon was equipped with security cameras.44  Based largely on this se-
curity footage, investigators from the City of Chicago’s Independent
Police Review Authority recommended that the officers who were in-
volved be suspended.45  Additionally, the victim received a substantial
settlement.46
The Klyzek, McDonald, and Scott cases illustrate the important role
that video footage can serve in exposing potential police misconduct.
Video footage of police conduct obtained from dash cameras, security
cameras, and bystander cell phone footage is an invaluable means to-
ward achieving greater transparency in law enforcement.  However,
individuals may hesitate to record their interactions with police due to
fear and continued confusion over Illinois’ recently changed eaves-
dropping statute.
B. The Illinois Eavesdropping Law in 2013 and in Prior Years
The Illinois eavesdropping statute as it existed prior to the 2014
amendments has adversely influenced the availability of bystander
video footage of public interactions with law enforcement.  This is be-
cause until recently, Illinois had one of the harshest eavesdropping
laws in the United States.47  Under the Illinois eavesdropping statute
42. Odette Yousef, Three Police Officers in Asian Salon Raid Recommended for Suspension,
WBEZ 91.5 CHI. (Sept. 1, 2015, 1:30 PM), https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/three-police-
officers-in-asian-salon-raid-recommended-for-suspension/c0f0e729-21e8-4a49-8f4a-9244866956
42 (“The investigation by the Independent Police Review Authority centered on twelve named
and one unknown officer alleged to have raided the salon on July 31, 2013.”).
43. Robert Wildeboer, IPRA Fails to Pursue Potential Crime by Cops Caught on Video,
WBEZ 91.5 (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.wbez.org/print/113018.
44. Id. (“[A cop] notices a computer screen below the counter.  He looks at it and realizes
there’s a video camera.  He points two fingers at his own eyes and calls out to everyone quote,
‘Hey! Hey! There’s eyes!’”).
45. Yousef, supra note 42 (“The agency that reviews allegations of police misconduct in Chi- R
cago has recommended suspension for three officers in a racially-charged police raid of a West
Town tanning salon.”).
46. City Approves Settlement for Tanning Salon Manager in Police Abuse Case, NBC CHI.
(Sept. 9, 2014, 8:33 AM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/City-Approves-Settlement-for-
Tanning-Salon-Manager-in-Police-Abuse-Case-274400761.html (“[The City] approved a
$150,000 settlement of a lawsuit filed by a tanning salon manager who claims she was struck by a
police officer and verbally abused.”).
47. See Terry, supra note 7. R
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that was in effect prior to the 2014 amendments, it was illegal for an
individual to record anyone without first obtaining their permission.48
The law was amended in 2014 and 2015;49 however, because the law
has been in flux, there are signs that the public continues to not under-
stand whether or not it is lawful to record on-duty police officers in
public.50  The public’s misapprehension of their rights may cause by-
standers to avoid recording the police in order to avoid violating the
law.51
As of 2013, the Illinois eavesdropping statute prohibited anyone
from “(1) [k]nowingly and intentionally us[ing] an eavesdropping de-
vice for the purpose of hearing or recording all or any part of any
conversation or intercepts, retains, or transcribes electronic communi-
cation unless he does so . . . with the consent of all of the parties to
such conversation.”52  Additionally, the Illinois eavesdropping statute
imposed a more significant sentence when the subject of the prohib-
ited eavesdropping was a law enforcement officer.53  A first-time
eavesdropping offense against a member of the general public was a
Class 4 felony, while a second offense was a Class 3 felony.54  Mean-
while, the same eavesdropping offense committed against a law en-
forcement officer “while in the performance of his or her official
duties,” called for an elevated punishment as a Class 1 felony.55  In
2013, a Class 4 felony in Illinois was punishable by a term of imprison-
ment “of not less than one year and not more than 3 years”56 and a
Class 3 felony was punishable by a term of imprisonment of “not less
than 2 years and not more than 5 years.”57  By contrast, a Class 1
48. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (2013), invalidated by Illinois v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, 6
N.E.3d 120, and Illinois v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, 6 N.E.3d 154.
49. See Monique Garcia, Quinn Signs New Illinois Eavesdropping Rules into Law, CHI. TRIB.
(Dec. 30, 2014, 5:53 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-quinn-signs-illinois-eavesdrop
ping-law-met-1231-20141230-story.html.
50. Joseph Erbentraut, No, Illinois Did Not Just Pass a Law Making It Illegal to Record Police
Officers, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 10, 2014, 4:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/
10/illinois-eavesdropping-law_n_6303454.html (“Contrary to what you may have recently read
on your Facebook feed, the state of Illinois’ new eavesdropping legislation will not prohibit the
recording of police officers.”).
51. See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compli-
ance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984).  “If the legal standard is uncertain, even
actors who behave ‘optimally’ in terms of overall social welfare will face some chance of being
held liable because of the unpredictability of the legal rule. . . .  [T]hese actors can usually reduce
that chance by ‘overcomplying.’” Id.
52. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1) (2013).
53. Id. § 14-4.
54. Id. § 14-4(a).
55. Id. § 14-4(b).
56. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-45 (2013).
57. Id. § 5-4.5-40.
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felony imposed a term of imprisonment of “not less than 4 years and
not more than 15 years.”58  Therefore, the same illegal act carried
nearly two times the punishment simply because of the identity of the
victim.
The heightened punishment clause for illegal eavesdropping of-
fenses committed against law enforcement officers was added to the
Illinois eavesdropping statute in 1999.59  The original bill was sup-
ported by law enforcement groups.60  These proponents of the bill in-
tended that the statutory amendments served a crime-fighting
function by addressing “the problem of street gangs’ use of cloned
electronic devices, such as pagers, to gather information on law en-
forcement investigations.”61
Despite the legislative intent of discouraging interference with po-
lice investigations, the Illinois eavesdropping statute that was in effect
prior to 2014 was used to arrest and prosecute individuals who, for the
purpose of documenting their own interaction with police, recorded
law enforcement officers in the operation of their duties.62  Many of
these arrests and prosecutions were high-profile cases that attracted
extensive news coverage.63  Given that deterrence has historically
been considered one of the main objectives of criminal law,64 criminal-
izing the act of recording police intrinsically discouraged such
conduct.
The ACLU of Illinois estimated that the State of Illinois prosecuted
no less than fourteen individuals between 2004 and 2012 for recording
police officers in violation of the Illinois eavesdropping statute.65  In
one instance from 2009, police arrested Christopher Drew and
charged him with a Class 1 felony under the Illinois eavesdropping
statute for audio-recording his own arrest for selling art on the street
58. Id. § 5-4.5-30.
59. H.B. 526, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1999). Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4
(1998), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4 (1999).
60. H.R. Transcript, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 21–22 (Ill. May 19, 1999), http://ilga.gov/
house/transcripts/htrans91/t051999.pdf.
61. S. Transcript, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 200 (Ill. May 13, 1999), http://ilga.gov/senate/
transcripts/strans91/ST051399.pdf.
62. Terry, supra note 7. R
63. See infra notes 65–72 and accompanying text. R
64. See Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
259, 259–60 (1972) (“The idea that law enforcement—the apprehension and punishment of law
breakers—serves partly as a means of deterring future crimes by those apprehended and by
others is basic to crime control legislation, ancient and modern.”).
65. See Court Issues Order Barring Controversial Enforcement of Illinois’ Eavesdropping Law,
ACLU ILL. (July 9, 2012, 10:46 AM), http://www.aclu-il.org/court-issues-order-barring-contro
versial-enforcement-of-illinois-eavesdropping-law/.
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without a permit.66  Likewise in 2010, Tiawanda Moore was arrested
and charged with a felony under the Illinois eavesdropping statute.67
Moore was arrested and prosecuted for making audio-recordings of
her interactions with law enforcement officers as she attempted to file
a sexual harassment complaint against another officer in the depart-
ment.68  In 2010, a police officer arrested Louis Frobe for felony
eavesdropping for recordings that he created during a routine traffic
stop.69  Unconvinced that he was actually in an area with a 35 mile per
hour speed limit, Mr. Frobe decided to record his location as well as
his interaction with the police officer.70  The police officer, upon notic-
ing the recording, arrested Mr. Frobe.71  Mr. Frobe spent the night in
jail and was released on bond the following day; ultimately, however,
the local prosecutor did not charge Mr. Frobe.72  Though Drew,
Moore, and Frobe recorded their encounters with law enforcement,
their arrests and prosecutions were permissible under the Illinois
eavesdropping statute that was in effect prior to 2014.73
C. The Seventh Circuit Questions the Validity of the Illinois
Eavesdropping Statute
The Illinois eavesdropping statute, as it existed prior to 2014, even-
tually fell under judicial scrutiny.  Notably, civil liberties groups op-
posed the law.74  The ACLU eventually filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleg-
ing that the Illinois Eavesdropping law violated the First Amendment
66. Terry, supra note 7. R
67. Eugene Volokh, Woman Jailed Two Weeks for Recording Chicago P.D.’s Internal Affairs
Officers Can Sue for a Fourth Amendment Violation, WASH. POST (May 1, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/01/woman-jailed-two-weeks-for-
recording-chicago-p-d-s-internal-affairs-officers-can-sue-for-a-fourth-amendment-violation.
68. Id.
69. Paul Meincke, Special Segment: Felony Eavesdropping, ABC 7 CHI. (Sept. 27, 2011, 8:30
PM), http://abc7chicago.com/archive/8370540/.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See supra notes 52–61 and accompanying text. R
74. ACLU Seeks End to Prosecutions for Recording Public Conversations with Police, ACLU
(Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-seeks-end-prosecutions-recording-public-conver
sations-police (“The media reported that Chicago police were conducting random searches of
bags and backpacks of individuals who were passing by Chicago beaches. . . .  When the ACLU
investigated, it could not use widely available audio/video recording devices . . . to document
police activity and conversations, because doing so would risk arrest or prosecution.”).
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of the United States Constitution.75  The case was appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.76
In ACLU v. Alvarez, the ACLU sued then-current Cook County
State’s Attorney, Anita Alvarez, in a pre-enforcement action.77  The
ACLU wanted to initiate a “police accountability program” that
would involve making “audiovisual recordings of police officers per-
forming their duties in public places and speaking at a volume audible
to bystanders.”78  In order to pursue such a program, the ACLU
sought declaratory relief stating that the ACLU would not be prose-
cuted under the Illinois eavesdropping statute for engaging in such a
program.79  The Seventh Circuit granted a preliminary injunction
preventing the State’s Attorney from enforcing the Illinois eavesdrop-
ping statute against the ACLU’s “police accountability program.”80
The court determined that the law constrained “a medium of expres-
sion commonly used for the preservation and communication of infor-
mation and ideas, thus triggering First Amendment scrutiny.”81  The
court found that the law “criminalized the nonconsensual recording of
most any oral communication, including recordings of public officials
doing the public’s business in public and regardless of whether the
recording is open or surreptitious” and was thus inconsistent with its
narrow purpose of protecting “conversational privacy.”82  Accord-
ingly, the Seventh Circuit indicated that the Illinois eavesdropping law
was almost certainly unconstitutional because it “restricts far more
speech than necessary to protect legitimate privacy interests.”83
The court in Alvarez, also made several observations.  First, the
court noted that Illinois maintained the most far-reaching eavesdrop-
ping statute that the court was aware of because it completely ignored
the distinction between conversations conducted with and without an
expectation of privacy.84  Second, the court cautioned that allowing
police recordings is not without limits, noting that “police may take all
reasonable steps to maintain safety and control, secure crime scenes
75. Complaint, ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-cv-05235), 2010 WL
3409777.
76. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 586.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 586.
83. Id. at 586–87.
84. Id. at 595 n.4. (“As best we can tell, the Illinois statute is the broadest of its kind; no other
wiretapping or eavesdropping statute prohibits the open recording of police officers lacking any
expectation of privacy.”).
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and accident sites, and protect the integrity and confidentiality of in-
vestigations.”85  The court further stated, “While an officer surely can-
not issue a ‘move on’ order to a person because he is recording, the
police may order bystanders to disperse for reasons related to public
safety and . . . other legitimate law-enforcement needs.”86  Thus, the
court recognized that there was a legitimate need for law enforcement
to maintain order, but the court determined that the scope of the
eavesdropping law exceeded that goal.87
D. The Illinois Supreme Court Invalidates the Illinois
Eavesdropping Statute in 2014
Ultimately, the validity of the Illinois eavesdropping statute came
before the Illinois Supreme Court, which held the statute unconstitu-
tional in the two concurrent opinions of Illinois v. Clark88 and Illinois
v. Melongo89 —both released in March 2014.  In Illinois v. Melongo,
the defendant was charged with violating the Illinois eavesdropping
law for surreptitiously recording her telephone conversation with a
Cook County court administrator and posting that recording online.90
The defendant moved to dismiss the case, asserting that the Illinois
eavesdropping law violated the First Amendment and due process.91
The court acknowledged that the purpose of the law was “to protect
conversational privacy.”92  However, the court pointed out that then-
current law “deem[ed] all conversations to be private and, thus, not
subject to recording absent consent, even if the participants have no
expectation of privacy.”93  Under this formulation, the court reasoned
that the law “criminalize[d] a wide range of innocent conduct.”94  To
illustrate this point, the court set forth examples of acts that would be
criminal under the law, such as, recording a loud argument in public
or recording fans cheering at a sporting event.95  The court stated that
because the Illinois eavesdropping statute “burden[ed] substantially
more speech than is necessary to serve a legitimate state interest in
protecting conversational privacy,” it failed to pass an intermediate
85. Id. at 607.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 2014 IL 115776, 6 N.E.3d 154.
89. 2014 IL 114852, 6 N.E.3d 120.
90. Id. ¶ 7.
91. Id. ¶ 8.
92. Id. ¶ 22.
93. Id.
94. Id. ¶ 29.
95. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 29.
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scrutiny test and was therefore unconstitutional.96  The companion
case, Clark, reached a substantially similar conclusion.
In Clark, the defendant was prosecuted under the Illinois eaves-
dropping statute for recording his conversations with opposing coun-
sel and a judge, without their consent, who were involved in the
defendant’s child support case.97  The defendant asserted that the law
violated the First Amendment of the Constitution.98  In analyzing the
law, the court applied the overbreadth doctrine “whereby a law may
be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications
are unconstitutional.”99
The Illinois Supreme Court’s overbreadth analysis first required it
to determine what the challenged statute covered,100 and second, what
conduct the challenged statute was intended to protect.101  In its anal-
ysis, the court found that the challenged statute was extremely broad
and criminalized “recording of all conversations except in limited cir-
cumstances specifically allowed by the statute.”102  The court reiter-
ated the rule that a content-neutral law will be upheld against a First
Amendment challenge “if it advances important governmental inter-
ests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden
substantially more speech than necessary to further those inter-
ests.”103  Given that the law criminalized all nonconsensual record-
ings, the court found that the law’s purpose was to “protect
conversational privacy.”104
Thus, the court formulated the final question as “whether the
means the legislature has chosen to further this interest in conversa-
tional privacy places a substantially greater burden on speech than is
necessary to further the interest.”105  In answering this question, the
court determined that individuals hold a “valid interest in the privacy
of their communications and a legitimate expectation that their pri-
vate conversations will not be recorded by those not privy to the con-
versation.”106  In such instances, the statute properly criminalizes such
recordings.107  However, the court maintained that the law addition-
96. Id. ¶ 31.
97. Illinois v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 1, 6 N.E.3d 154, 156–57.
98. Id.
99. Id. ¶ 11.
100. Id. ¶ 14.
101. Id. ¶ 20.
102. Id. ¶ 14.
103. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 19.
104. Id. ¶ 22.
105. Id. ¶ 20.
106. Id. ¶ 21.
107. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-4\DPL402.txt unknown Seq: 13 21-SEP-17 7:28
2017] RECENT LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATION 1145
ally criminalized recording in a multitude of nonprivate scenarios that
do not implicate a privacy interest, such as, recording a public argu-
ment or recording a public encounter with the police.108  Accordingly,
the court held that the Illinois eavesdropping statute was unconstitu-
tional in light of the First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine because
it failed an intermediate scrutiny test and “burden[ed] substantially
more speech than [was] necessary to serve the interests the statute
may legitimately serve.”109
E. Illinois Legislature’s Response to Court Decision
In response to the Illinois Supreme Court’s invalidation of the Illi-
nois eavesdropping statute, the Illinois legislature amended the statute
in 2014.110  These changes were signed into law by former Governor
Pat Quinn on December 30, 2014.111  The amendments are more ver-
bose than the previous version of the statute, providing in pertinent
part that:
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when he or she knowingly and
intentionally:
(1) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for
the purpose of overhearing, transmitting, or recording all or any
part of any private conversation to which he or she is not a party
unless he or she does so with the consent of all of the parties to the
private conversation;
(2) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for
the purpose of transmitting or recording all or any part of any pri-
vate conversation to which he or she is a party unless he or she does
so with the consent of all other parties to the private conversation;
(3) Intercepts, records, or transcribes, in a surreptitious manner,
any private electronic communication to which he or she is not a
party unless he or she does so with the consent of all parties to the
private electronic communication.112
In effect, the amendment decriminalized public recordings by ex-
pressly defining an eavesdropping offense as involving “private” con-
versation and communication.  Therefore, under the amended statute,
recording a public conversation was no longer deemed criminal, no
matter if you were a party to that conversation or not.  The statute
further enumerated what was deemed criminal and lawful in terms of
108. Id.
109. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 23.
110. Garcia, supra note 49. R
111. Id. (“Gov. Pat Quinn on Tuesday signed a measure into law that puts in place new rules
regarding how private conversations can be recorded following an Illinois Supreme Court deci-
sion that struck down the state’s eavesdropping law for being too broad.”).
112. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (2014 & Supp. 2016).
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recording private conversations.  First, the statutory changes meant
that you could record others having a private conversation without
their consent if you recorded them in an open manner.  However, you
could only record them “surreptitiously” if you had consent.  Second,
you could record others with whom you were conversing if you did so
in an open manner.  However, you could only record that conversa-
tion “surreptitiously” with the other parties’ consent.
The phraseology of the law is confusing for many reasons.  First, it
seems unlikely that a recording could simultaneously be both consen-
sual and surreptitious.  This makes parts of the statute redundant.  Ex-
amining the statute practically, to obtain consent to record a
conversation would bring the fact of recording out of secret, thus mak-
ing the recording non-surreptitious by definition.  Second, the amend-
ment did not contain express language stating that public recordings
were lawful.  Additionally, because there are many conceivable scena-
rios in which an individual may encounter law enforcement officers in
a place that is not necessarily public, uncertainties remained in this
iteration of the law insofar as recording encounters with law enforce-
ment were concerned.
Furthermore, even after these amendments, the statute retained
heightened punishment for eavesdropping offenses committed against
law enforcement officers.113  The sentencing structure was only
slightly altered.114  A first offense of eavesdropping committed against
a member of the general public continues to be a Class 4 felony and a
second such offense is a Class 3 felony.115  A first-time offense of
eavesdropping against a law enforcement officer is a Class 3 felony,
rather than a Class 1 felony, and a second such offense is a Class 2
felony.116
F. Illinois Legislature’s Response to Current Events
In August 2015, the Illinois legislature responded to public discon-
tent against the Illinois eavesdropping statute as amended in 2014, and
113. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/14-4.
114. Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4 (2013), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4 (2014 &
Supp. 2016).
115. Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(a) (2013), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(a)
(2014 & Supp. 2016).  As of 2016, a Class 4 felony carries a term of imprisonment of “not less
than one year and not more than 3 years.”  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-45 (2016).
116. Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b) (2013), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b)
(2015 & Supp. 2016).  As of 2016, a Class 1 felony carries a term of imprisonment of “not less
than 4 years and not more than 15 years.”  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-30 (2016).  Whereas, as
of 2016, a Class 3 felony is punishable by a term of imprisonment of “not less than 2 years and
not more than 5 years.” Id. § 5-4.5-40.  A Class 2 felony carries a term of imprisonment of not
less than 3 years and not more than 7 years. Id. § 5-4.5-35(a).
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recent high-profile cases of police misconduct, by once again amend-
ing the statute.117  The relevant statutory changes, which took effect
January 1, 2016, added a clause that had the potential to quell public
concerns that the Illinois eavesdropping statute may unfairly suppress
recordings of police misconduct by stating outright that, “[n]othing in
this Article shall prohibit any individual, not a law enforcement of-
ficer, from recording a law enforcement officer in the performance of
his or her duties in a public place or in circumstances in which the
officer has no reasonable expectation of privacy.”118  The statute at-
tempts to balance an individual’s right to record law enforcement of-
ficers in the performance of their duties with the latitude law
enforcement officers require to perform their jobs by providing that
law enforcement officers “may take reasonable action to maintain
safety and control, secure crime scenes and accident sites, protect the
integrity and confidentiality of investigations, and protect the public
safety and order.”119  The amendment clarifies the circumstances in
which the public may lawfully record law enforcement officers by in-
cluding descriptive language, such as “in the performance of his or her
duties,” “in a public place,” and “[when] the officer has no reasonable
expectation of privacy.”120
In August 2015, the Illinois General Assembly continued to respond
to the national concern of police misconduct by enacting the Law En-
forcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act (the Act).121  The purpose
of the legislation was to achieve “trust and mutual respect between
law enforcement agencies and the communities they protect and serve
[which] are essential to effective policing and the integrity of [the]
criminal justice system.”122  According to the Act:
The General Assembly recognizes that officer-worn body cameras
have developed as a technology that has been used and experi-
mented with by police departments. Officer-worn body cameras will
provide state-of-the art evidence collection and additional opportu-
nities for training and instruction.  Further, officer-worn body cam-
eras may provide impartial evidence and documentation to settle
disputes and allegations of officer misconduct.  Ultimately, the uses
of officer-worn body cameras will help collect evidence while im-
proving transparency and accountability, and strengthening public
trust.123
117. Geiger & Gorner, supra note 13. R
118. S.B. 1304, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2015).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 706/10-1 to -35 (2016).
122. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 706/10-5.
123. Id.
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In addition, the Act provides mandatory rules regulating the use of
optional police body cameras.124  The legislation applies to “[a]ny law
enforcement agency which employs the use of officer-worn body cam-
eras . . . whether or not the agency receives or has received monies
from the Law Enforcement Camera Grant Fund.”125  It must be
pointed out that the Act does not mandate the use of officer-worn
body cameras.  Rather, the Act merely subjects those law enforce-
ment agencies that do utilize body cameras to various regulations,
some of which are very stringent and potentially costly.126
G. Regulatory Compliance with the Act
The Act requires compliance with extensive technological and pro-
cedural standards.127  Technological compliance requires, at minimum,
that the officer-worn body camera must have the capability to record
“at least the 30 seconds prior to camera activation” and for at least ten
hours.128  Procedurally, the officer-worn body camera must be acti-
vated whenever an officer is in uniform, on duty, and engaged in any
law enforcement-related activity.129  Recordings must be kept by the
law enforcement agency for ninety days under ordinary circumstances,
for two years if a recording has been flagged, or until “final disposition
and order from the court” if the recording has been flagged and used
in a “criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding.”130  Prior to disclo-
sure pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request, the law en-
forcement agency must also redact the recording.131
124. Id. § 10-15.
125. Id.
126. See infra notes 127–48 and accompanying text. R
127. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 706/10-20.
128. Id. § 10-20(a)(1)–(2).  The ten hour requirement does not apply if the officer-worn cam-
era was purchased prior to July 1, 2015. Id. § 10-20(a)(2).
129. Id. § 10-20(a)(3).
130. Id. § 10-20(a)(7).
131. Id. § 10-20(b) (“Any recording disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act shall be
redacted to remove identification of any person that appears on the recording and is not the
officer, a subject of the encounter, or directly involved in the encounter.”). Redaction of a re-
quested video recording involves:
review[ing] the video in its entirety . . . identifying images and information that should
not be released, including . . . biographical information, juvenile faces, undercover of-
ficers, [and] informants . . . as determined by the staff attorney.  Any items that need to
be redacted are identified by the officer by providing a description and time stamp of
the selected images.  The request is then forwarded to the MPD Video Services Unit
(VSU) for action.
MICHAEL D. WHITE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESS-
ING THE EVIDENCE 33 (2014), https://www.ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/files/spotlight/
download/Police%20Officer%20Body-Worn%20Cameras.pdf.
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A recording is flagged under numerous circumstances.132  A record-
ing is flagged when a complaint against an officer is filed; when an
officer discharges a weapon or uses force; when anyone in the record-
ing dies or suffers great bodily harm; when an arrest results; when an
officer is the subject of a misconduct investigation; when a “supervisor
of the officer, prosecutor, defendant, or court determines that the en-
counter has evidentiary value in a criminal prosecution”; or when the
officer so requests.133  Given the myriad circumstances under which a
recording is deemed to be flagged, the two year retention requirement
is likely to be elicited frequently and at great cost.134
The technology costs are not limited to the price of the officer-worn
cameras, but the costs of data storage as well.135  Notwithstanding
whether a law enforcement agency decides to store its camera-col-
lected data in-house or with a third party, the costs are substantial.136
In-house data storage involves purchasing new computer equipment,
hiring technical staff, and obtaining data security software.137  Mean-
while, working with a third-party vendor involves hiring a vendor for
data management and obtaining various technical assistance services
as needed.138  To put these figures in context, it may cost approxi-
mately $3,570 to purchase one officer-worn body camera and store its
data for two years.139  With 12,100 full-time police officers in the City
of Chicago alone, as of October 2016, the collective costs would be
substantial.140
In addition to the costs of purchasing cameras and managing cam-
era data, there are administrative compliance costs.  Studies of law
enforcement agencies that have undertaken officer-worn body camera
programs in Mesa and Phoenix, Arizona have found that there is a
132. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 706/10-20(a)(7)(B).
133. Id.  The flagging requirement for arrests does not pertain to minor traffic or business
offenses. Id. § 10-20(a)(7)(B)(2).
134. Lindsay Miller & Jessica Toliver, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Implementing a Body-Worn Cam-
era Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned 17, 34 (2014), http://www.policeforum.
org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/implementing%20a%20body-worn%20
camera%20program.pdf.  “Although the initial costs of purchasing the cameras can be steep,
many police executives said that data storage is the most expensive aspect of a body-worn cam-
era program.” Id. at 32.
135. Id. at 32–33.
136. Id. at 32.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 16, 32.
139. Id. at 32 (“Another department spent $67,500 to purchase 50 cameras and will spend
approximately $111,000 to store the video on a cloud for two years.”).
140. Cecilia Reyes, To Grow Size of Police Department, Chicago Will Need Twice What Is
Planned, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 17, 2016, 10:37 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/data/ct-po
lice-retirement-mayors-plan-20161002-htmlstory.html.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-4\DPL402.txt unknown Seq: 18 21-SEP-17 7:28
1150 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1133
significant time-cost involved.141  Officers must download their videos,
make reports, manage disclosure requests, and redact videos as
necessary.142
Law enforcement agencies are daunted by the many costs associ-
ated with initiating an officer-worn body camera program that com-
plies with the Act.143  Facing these regulations, law enforcement
agencies have, at times, stopped pursuing officer-worn body camera
programs.144  The executive director of the Illinois Association of
Chiefs of Police has indicated that more police chiefs were considering
obtaining officer-worn body cameras before the Act went into
effect.145
Though the Act is a powerful first step in seeking to achieve trans-
parency in law enforcement, as currently written, the statute may actu-
ally dissuade law enforcement agencies from implementing officer-
worn body camera programs.  This is because the statute imposes
costly and extensive regulations while leaving use of officer-worn
body cameras optional.146  If law enforcement agencies decline to ini-
tiate officer-worn body camera programs due to their high costs, the
goals of transparency in law enforcement and regaining the public’s
trust through use of officer-worn body cameras will not be achieved.
It is well-observed that when an activity is highly regulated, actors
tend to decline to participate.147  This phenomenon seems to be occur-
141. CHARLES M. KATZ ET AL., EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OFFICER WORN BODY CAM-
ERAS IN THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2014), https://publicservice.asu.edu/sites/default/
files/ppd_spi_feb_20_2015_final.pdf.  A study of the Phoenix Police Department’s officer-worn
body camera pilot program reported that “officers were dissatisfied with long down load times
[and] increased amount of time that it took to complete reports.” Id. A study of the Mesa
Arizona Police Department’s program found that officers experienced an “increase to their ad-
ministrative workload . . . [and] that they were spending so much time, after their shifts were
over, downloading and tagging their videos.” MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 134, at 33. R
142. See MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 134, at 33. R
143. Tobias Wall, Body Cameras to ‘Stay in Their Boxes’ as Local Top Cops Pan New Law,
BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (Aug. 12, 2015, 11:51 AM), http://www.bnd.com/news/local/arti
cle30873633.html#! (“The Shiloh Police Department’s stash of a dozen new body cameras will
stay in the boxes they came in . . . .  [Police Chief James Stover of The Shiloh Police Department]
said that while much of the law ‘is very good,’ some portions of it are ‘ridiculous.’”).  Sheriff
Rick Watson of St. Clair County said that the law is “too cumbersome” and that “Legislators
don’t take the time to actually talk to the police and ask ‘If we pass this law, how will you
institute it?  How much will it cost?  How much manpower will you use?’” Id.
144. Id.
145. John Reynolds, Springfield Police Chief Bemoans Illinois Police Body Cam Law, J. STAR
(Nov. 25, 2015, 10:00 PM), http://www.pjstar.com/article/20151125/NEWS/151129591.
146. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 706/10-15 (2016).
147. See, e.g., Over-Regulated America, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.economist
.com/node/21547789 (explaining that the Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, created such extensive
and costly regulations for listing shares on the stockmarket in the United States that “America’s
share of initial public offerings fell from 67% in 2002 (when Sarbox passed) to 16% last year”).
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ring with respect to the current body camera law.  When law enforce-
ment agencies are confronted with complex regulatory standards, they
tend towards opting out of participation in the regulated program, if
allowed to do so.148  Such is the case with the Act.  In practice—and
contrary to its originally designed intent—the Act deters officer-worn
body cameras programs.149  Given the importance of the legislative
purpose behind the Act, implementation should be pursued on a
mandatory, rather than optional basis.
III. ANALYSIS
Video footage provided by bystanders, dash cameras, or security
footage can be highly influential in uncovering police misconduct.150
Cases such as that of Laquan McDonald, Walter Scott, and Jessica
Klyzek illustrate the need for a mandatory and uniformly imple-
mented police body camera program.151  Bystander and security cam-
era footage will not always be available.  Likewise, dash camera
footage may fail to record officers outside the view of their vehicles.152
Individuals may also be deterred from recording interactions with po-
lice due to fear of arrest or prosecution under the Illinois eavesdrop-
ping law.153  Accordingly, law enforcement misconduct may go
undetected.  In order to protect the public and law enforcement of-
ficers as well as build mutual trust between the two, a reliable source
of video recording footage is needed in Illinois.
Illinois must mandate and fund officer-worn body cameras in order
achieve the legislative purpose announced in the Act of effectuating
“trust and mutual respect between law enforcement agencies and the
communities they protect and serve.”154  This Part argues that: (A) the
use of officer-worn body cameras must be mandated uniformly be-
cause it deters misconduct by law enforcement officers and the pub-
lic155; (B) use of officer-worn body cameras must be mandated
because it exonerates law enforcement officers who are falsely ac-
cused156; and (C) officer-worn body cameras have the potential to
148. Wall, supra note 143. R
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 30–46 and accompanying text. R
151. See Dana Ford et al., Chicago Protestors March as Police Release Video of Officer Shoot-
ing Teen, CNN (Nov. 24, 2015, 10:49 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/24/us/laquan-mcdonald-
chicago-shooting-video/; see also Ford, supra note 37; Yousef, supra note 42. R
152. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 37. R
153. See supra notes 53–61 and accompanying text. R
154. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 706/10-5 (2016).
155. See infra notes 158–71 and accompanying text. R
156. See infra notes 173–76 and accompanying text. R
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save millions in tax dollars that would otherwise be spent to investi-
gate, defend, and settle claims of misconduct by law enforcement.157
A. Officer-Worn Body Cameras Deter Misconduct
The current legislation must be amended to mandate use of officer-
worn body cameras because camera programs deter misconduct by
law enforcement officers and the general public.  It is a well-known,
scientifically studied fact that individuals behave better when they
know they are being watched.158  The experiences of law enforcement
agencies that have undertaken officer-worn body camera programs
have also confirmed this behavior.159
Improvements in the conduct of law enforcement officers when
wearing body cameras have been experienced by law enforcement
agencies and have been observed in numerous empirical studies.160  A
study involving the Rialto Police Department in Rialto, California, at-
tempted to measure the impact of officer-worn body cameras on law
enforcement officers’ use of force and the number of complaints filed
against them.161  Over a period of one year, officers were randomly
assigned to experimental shifts in which they used officer-worn body
cameras and control shifts in which they did not.162  When officers did
not utilize officer-worn body cameras they were more than twice as
likely to exercise use-of-force.163  The results also identified an 87.5%
reduction in the number of complaints filed against law enforcement
officers who wore body cameras.164
157. See infra notes 177–205 and accompanying text. R
158. See Sander van der Linden, How the Illusion of Being Observed Can Make You a Better
Person, SCI. AM. (May 3, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-illusion-of-
being-observed-can-make-you-better-person; see also Jason G. Goldman How Being Watched
Changes You–Without You Knowing, BBC (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/
20140209-being-watched-why-thats-good.  Psychology experiments have shown that children
take less Halloween candy when nobody else is present if they can see their reflection in a mirror
and bicycle thefts are reduced by 62% when “We Are Watching You” signs are posted. Id.
“Humans . . . care a great deal about being watched.  We change our behaviour and choices
without even realising.” Id.
159. See KATZ ET AL., supra note 141, at 5–7. R
160. See infra notes 161–71 and accompanying text. R
161. Barak Ariel et al., The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citi-
zens’ Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 509, 509–10 (2015).
162. Id. at 510.
163. Id. at 523 (“During the experimental period a total of 25 incidents of police use-of-force
were recorded . . . of which 17 occurred during control shifts and 8 during experimental shifts.”).
164. Id. at 524. (“We did, however, observe a significant, overall reduction of citizen’s com-
plaints, from 24 complaints filed in the 12 months before the trial to three during the trial
period.”).
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Similar results have been observed in other studies.  In Plymouth,
United Kingdom, complaints filed against law enforcement officers
fell by 14.3% after initiation of an officer-worn camera program.165  A
study of the officer-worn body camera program in Mesa, Arizona, re-
vealed that law enforcement officers utilizing officer-worn body cam-
eras received 60% fewer complaints than officers not utilizing
cameras.166  A study of the Phoenix, Arizona officer-worn body cam-
era program observed a 23% reduction in complaints against law en-
forcement officers utilizing officer-worn cameras.167  Given the
promising findings observed by numerous law enforcement agencies,
the use of officer-worn body cameras in Illinois should be pursued on
a mandatory basis.
Anecdotal and empirical evidence showing that the public’s conduct
improves along with the use of officer-worn body cameras, and cam-
eras in general, support more vigorous implementation of officer-
worn body cameras in Illinois.168  A Scotland study showed that areas
where officer-worn body cameras were utilized experienced a 26% de-
cline in crime.169  Similarly, a study of visible, closed-circuit security
cameras in the United Kingdom observed a reduction in crime levels
in the areas where security cameras were utilized.170  Law enforce-
ment officers in Illinois have noted that the public has reacted posi-
tively to officer-worn cameras and that the cameras have had a
beneficial and corrective impact on public conduct.171  Given the ben-
eficial impact of officer-worn cameras on the conduct of both law en-
forcement officers and the public, optional use of officer-worn
cameras is insufficient to achieve the restoration of trust between the
public and law enforcement.
165. KATZ ET AL., supra note 141, at 5. R
166. Id. at 6–7.
167. Id. at 40–41.
168. See infra notes 169–76 and accompanying text. R
169. Id. at 6 (“[T]he study reported that breach of peace offenses declined 19%, vandalism
29%, minor assaults 27%, and serious assaults declined 60%.”).
170. Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Effects of Closed-Circuit Television on Crime,
587 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 110 (2003) (“CCTV had a significant desirable effect
on crime, although the overall reduction in crime was a rather small 4 percent. All nine studies
showing evidence of a desirable effect of CCTV on crime were carried out in the United
Kingdom.”)
171. Reynolds, supra note 145 (“Patrolman Barringer . . . said he recently stopped a man for R
speeding, and as he walked up to the car, he could hear that the man was upset.  ‘As I ap-
proached his car, he started ranting right away that I was stopping him from arriving at work on
time and he was going to be late because of me . . . .  I told him the video camera was running
[and] he immediately calmed down.’”).
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B. Camera Footage Exonerates Falsely-Accused Officers
The use of officer-worn body cameras must be mandated because it
exonerates law enforcement officers who are falsely accused.172  The
results of the Scotland study also showed that officer-worn body cam-
era footage facilitated law enforcement in effectively responding to
complaints filed against officers.173  In the Scotland study, officer-
worn camera footage exonerated law enforcement officers against all
claims made during the study period.174  The Phoenix study likewise
showed that officer-worn camera footage was a key tool to clear of-
ficers of unfounded claims because the footage could often corrobo-
rate that officers had acted appropriately.175  Additionally, officers in
the Phoenix study contended that individuals often declined to file
complaints at all due to the presence of officer-worn body cameras.176
C. Officer-Worn Body Cameras as a Cost-Saving Measure
One of the chief concerns of those opposing officer-worn body cam-
eras is the potentially high costs.177  Given the State of Illinois’ recent
budgetary crises, financial concerns are not unjustified.178  However,
amending the Act to provide for mandatory use of officer-worn body
cameras is not cost-prohibitive.  Under optimal conditions, uniform
utilization of officer-worn body cameras in Illinois can save millions of
dollars in tax revenues that would otherwise be spent investigating,
defending, and settling officer misconduct claims.
Law enforcement misconduct cases present a crippling burden to
the budgets of Illinois municipalities.179  Studies show that the use po-
172. See infra notes 173–76 and accompanying text. R
173. See KATZ ET AL., supra note 141, at 6. R
174. Id. Seven complaints were logged during the study period. Id. After the law enforce-
ment agency reviewed the footage, three complaints were immediately deemed unfounded and
the remaining four complaints were cleared after evaluating officer accounts of the incidents in
conjunction with the video footage. Id.
175. Id. at 41 (“[D]ata showed that those officers who wore cameras and received a complaint
were significantly less likely to have the complaint sustained when compared to the comparison
group . . . .  This suggests . . . the video file was likely to provide support to the officer.”).
176. Id. (“[O]fficers self reported a 300 percent increase in the number of times that an indi-
vidual was going to file a complaint but did not further pursue the complaint because of the
presence of a body camera.”)
177. See Wall, supra note 143. R
178. Elizabeth Campbell & Brian Chappatta, Illinois Downgraded by Fitch as State Budget
Crisis Worsens, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2015, 4:57 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-10-19/illinois-cut-by-fitch-as-fiscal-crisis-worsens-without-budget. On October 19, 2015,
Fitch Ratings downgraded Illinois’ bond rating from A- to BBB+, which is the worst rating
among all states. Id.
179. Jonah Newman, Chicago Police Misconduct Payouts Topped $50 Million in 2014, CHI.
REP. (Feb. 25, 2015), http://chicagoreporter.com/chicagopolicemisconductpayoutstopped50mil
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lice body cameras results in a reduction of excessive force by law en-
forcement as well as a reduction in citizen complaints.180  Reduction in
both the uses of force and number of complaints filed have the poten-
tial to correspond with reductions in costs incurred by municipalities
throughout Illinois.  Savings could result because claims of excessive
use of force by law enforcement are sometimes legitimate, but other
times they are unfounded.181  In either instance, video evidence
clearly and quickly demonstrates whether there was in fact wrongdo-
ing by the police.  Litigation costs would be kept low because un-
founded cases would never go to court, while legitimate cases could be
settled efficiently.
Since 2004, Chicago, alone, has paid out more than $500 million in
response to law enforcement misconduct cases.182  In 2014, City of
Chicago settlements and verdicts in law enforcement misconduct cases
totaled $54.2 million.183  Despite the enormity of this figure, it does
not reflect the total costs of law enforcement misconduct cases.184  Sal-
aries paid to City of Chicago lawyers paired with fees paid to outside
counsel contribute an additional $11.7 million dollars to the overall
costs of combatting law enforcement misconduct cases each year.185
Even if officer-worn body cameras do not prevent officer miscon-
duct and reduce the number of misconduct cases, the footage pro-
vided by officer-worn body cameras could put municipalities in a
better position to assess the evidence against them, take responsibility
early, and settle cases swiftly, thereby cutting investigation, litigation,
and judgment costs.  Predominately, cases of law enforcement miscon-
duct are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.186  One such case was
Regalado v. City of Chicago.187 Regalado was a law enforcement mis-
conduct case brought under to section 1983 prior to the advent of dash
lionin2014/ (“Police misconduct complaints accounted for just 15 percent of all cases brought
against [Chicago] that were settled last year, but more than half of all payouts.”).
180. See, e.g., KATZ ET AL., supra note 141, at 5–6. R
181. See infra notes 220–24 and accompanying text. R
182. Nick Wing, We Pay a Shocking Amount for Police Misconduct, and Cops Want Us Just to
Accept It. We Shouldn’t, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2015, 9:59 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2015/05/29/police-misconduct-settlements_n_7423386.html.
183. Newman, supra note 179. R
184. Id.
185. Id.  “Chicago paid nearly $63 million to 11 outside law firms to defend the city and its
police officers against allegations of misconduct from 2003 to 2012, or an average of $7.1 million
per year.” Id.  “[T]he city’s civil rights litigation division, which defend the city and police of-
ficers . . . [has] a budget of $4.6 million this year.” Id.
186. Richard G. Schott, Qualified Immunity: How It Protects Law Enforcement Officers, FBI,
https://leb.fbi.gov/2012/september/qualified-immunity-how-it-protects-law-enforcement-officers
(last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
187. 40 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-4\DPL402.txt unknown Seq: 24 21-SEP-17 7:28
1156 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1133
camera or officer-worn camera technology.188  After a jury verdict, the
case resulted in one of the largest payouts for law enforcement mis-
conduct in Illinois history.189
The case involved a man, Joseph Regalado, who had an outstanding
arrest warrant.190  When police approached Mr. Regalado, he ran.191
An officer caught up to Mr. Regalado and hit him in the back and the
head with a police flashlight.192  Though Mr. Regalado fell to the
ground motionless, a witness reported that an officer pinned Mr.
Regalado down in a prone position, lifted his head, and repeatedly
struck him in the head and face.193  Several of Mr. Regalado’s friends
arrived at the scene, whereupon the officers instructed the bystanders
to awaken the unconscious Mr. Regalado by spraying him with a
water hose.  The officers ultimately left Mr. Regalado unconscious on
the ground without rendering aid.194  Mr. Regalado’s friends called for
an ambulance when Mr. Regalado could not be revived.195  Due to the
beating, Mr. Regalado’s vertebral arteries were severed, he suffered a
stroke, and he was paralyzed.196  Though Mr. Regalado’s counsel of-
fered to settle the case for $16 million, the City of Chicago refused.197
Ultimately, the jury awarded Mr. Regalado $28 million.198
Conversely, when video footage is available, cases are settled
promptly.199  The recent settlement following the death of Laquan
McDonald in Chicago exemplifies this concept.200  Given the clear ev-
idence provided by dash camera footage, the City of Chicago accepted
civil responsibility within six months and paid a $5 million settlement
the McDonald family before a lawsuit was even initiated.201  In addi-
tion to the civil settlement, the available video footage contributed to
188. Id. at 1010–11.
189. Tim Hrenchir, Largest Payouts for Police Misconduct Lawsuits in Illinois, NEWSMAX
(Aug. 10, 2015, 11:18 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/FastFeatures/policemisconductlawsuit
payoutIllinois/2015/08/10/id/669473 (“A federal jury awarded $28 million in 1999 to the family of
Joseph Regalado, who suffered a paralyzing injury when he was allegedly beaten by a Chicago
police officer.”).
190. Regalado, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 1011.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1012.
196. Regalado, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
197. Matt O’Connor & Lola Smallwood, Jury Awards Paralyzed Man $28 Million, CHI. TRIB.
(Oct. 26, 1999), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-10-26/news/9910260090_1_police-miscon
duct-case-chicago-police-verdict.
198. Id.
199. Elinson & Frosch, supra note 32. R
200. Id.; see also supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. R
201. See Elinson & Frosch, supra note 32. R
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the Cook County State’s Attorney’s decision to charge Jason Van
Dyke with first-degree murder.202  When compared to Regalado,
which took nearly three years and cost the City of Chicago $28 million
and countless man-hours,203  the Laquan McDonald incident shows
how additional cameras can expedite the process.  Similar prompt and
efficient civil settlements have been observed throughout the country
when video footage is available.204
Detractors against officer-worn body cameras claim that they are
cost-prohibitive.205  However, use of officer-worn body cameras has
the potential to save tax dollars by preventing law enforcement mis-
conduct in the first place, reducing complaints against officers, and
facilitating expeditious settlements rather than costly litigation.  Ac-
cordingly, legislation should be amended to mandate compulsory and
uniform use of officer-worn body cameras in Illinois.
IV. IMPACT
Now more than ever, it is imperative that officer-worn body camera
programs be initiated uniformly throughout Illinois because Illinois is
facing surging crime rates206 and profound social unrest that has
erupted in response to recent cases of law enforcement misconduct.207
Officer-worn body cameras will provide footage of law enforcement
officer conduct thereby making the system transparent.  If the footage
captured by officer-worn body cameras largely shows officers con-
ducting themselves fairly, a body camera program will restore the le-
gitimacy of the system.208  Additionally, by promoting the legitimacy
of the criminal justice system, the implementation of a compulsory
202. Ford et al., supra note 151. R
203. O’Connor & Smallwood, supra note 197. R
204. See, e.g., Elinson & Frosch, supra note 32.  Similar prompt settlements were recently R
achieved on the basis of video evidence in San Bernardino County, California and Dallas, Texas.
Id.
205. See Wall, supra note 143. R
206. Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Murder Rates Rising Sharply in Many U.S. Cities, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/us/murder-rates-rising-sharply-in-
many-us-cities.html?_r=1.
207. Thousands March Around Country Protesting Against Police Violence, NBC NEWS (Dec.
13, 2014, 10:25 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-shooting/thousands-
march-around-country-protesting-against-police-violence-n267966.  Thousands of individuals
have marched in protest against police brutality in cities throughout the United States including
but not limited to: Washington D.C., Ferguson, New York City, Cleveland, and Chicago. Id.
208. See Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in
Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 513, 534–36 (2003).  Studies show that
procedural fairness provides a foundation for the development of legitimacy and how procedural
fairness is demonstrated by “quality of decisionmaking, quality of treatment, and overall assess-
ments of procedural justice.” Id. at 531.
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officer-worn body camera program will also foster compliance with
the law.209
A. Transparency Legitimizes the Criminal Justice System and
Promotes Compliance
The use of officer-worn body cameras should be implemented uni-
formly throughout Illinois because the transparency they provide pro-
motes the legitimacy of the criminal justice system and compliance
with the law.  Studies demonstrate that legitimacy is a crucial compo-
nent needed to foster an environment in which citizens comply with
the law.210  A leading view defines legitimacy as “the recognition of
the right to govern.”211  Scholars Anthony Bottoms and Justice
Tankebe have advanced a theoretical framework for viewing legiti-
macy in the law enforcement context as an interaction between
“claims to legitimacy by power-holders and responses by audi-
ences.”212  Within this framework, the public is viewed as the audience
and law enforcement officers are viewed as the power-holders.213
Bottoms and Tankebe posit that if “the power-holder is routinely us-
ing power to engage in corrupt practices, it is very likely that the pub-
lic’s recognition of his or her right to rule will be gradually
withdrawn.”214  Applying the Bottoms and Tankebe framework to the
current strained relationship between the public and law enforcement,
suggests that the public’s acknowledgment of law enforcement’s au-
thority is threatened by frequent, high-profile instances of misconduct
by law enforcement.
Bottoms and Tankebe argue that an important criterion for legiti-
macy from the audience’s vantage point is the power-holder’s “con-
formity to [r]ules.”215  Bottoms and Tankebe suggest that “blatant
illegality can diminish perceived legitimacy.”216  They point to studies
demonstrating that “obvious illegalities seriously undermine the legiti-
macy of the police among citizens.”217  In applying these theories to
police and community relations, it appears that incidents of police
brutality fall squarely within this framework as “obvious illegalities”
209. Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach
to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119, 120–21 (2012).
210. See generally Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 209. R
211. Id. at 125.
212. Id. at 119–20.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 125.
215. Id. at 133.
216. Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 209, at 138. R
217. Id.
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capable of diminishing law enforcement’s legitimacy.  Officer-worn
body cameras have the ability to demonstrate explicitly that law en-
forcement officers are exercising their power appropriately and com-
plying with the law.  Therefore, the reassurance and transparency
made available by officer-worn body cameras has the potential to
strengthen the public’s view of law enforcement’s legitimacy.  Bottoms
and Tankebe express that legitimacy is vital to a criminal justice sys-
tem because it leads to “improvements in legal compliance by citizens
. . . and a greater willingness on the part of the public to empower
criminal justice agencies.”218  Cities like Chicago are facing severe vio-
lent crime issues;219 therefore, the need for fostering compliance with
the law is paramount.
B. Officer-Worn Cameras Protect Law Enforcement Officers from
False Claims
Officer-worn body cameras also protect law enforcement officers by
providing video recording footage from a vantage point that is un-
available from dash cameras or bystander cell phone footage.  Dash
camera footage is inevitably limited to what can be seen from the
dashboard area of a police vehicle.  Additionally, bystander cell phone
footage is limited to the moment when a bystander decides to begin
recording, which may be long after a given interaction between an
individual and an officer begins.  The ability to record a law enforce-
ment officer’s full interaction with an individual becomes an attaina-
ble goal with the use of officer worn body cameras.
Agencies that utilize officer worn body cameras have already no-
ticed that the cameras successfully protect not only individuals, but
also law enforcement officers.220  In Albuquerque, New Mexico, an
officer’s body camera recorded his entire interaction with an intoxi-
cated woman who had been pulled over for drunk driving.221  The
woman later claimed that the officer sexually assaulted her.222  Body
camera footage cleared the law enforcement officer from the woman’s
false claims because the video showed that no inappropriate conduct
had occurred.223
218. Id. at 155.
219. Davey & Smith, supra note 206. R
220. Video: Body Cam Refutes Sexual Assault Claim Against NM Officer, POLICEONE (Oct.
20, 2014), https://www.policeone.com/police-products/body-cameras/articles/7691006-Video-
Body-cam-refutes-sexual-assault-claim-against-NM-officer/.
221. Id.
222. Id.  The woman claimed that the officer was “inappropriately touching [her] while [she]
was waiting in the car.” Id.
223. Id.
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In Selma, Alabama, a law enforcement officer responded to a call
regarding an individual who was exhibiting disorderly conduct.224  On
the scene, the law enforcement officer fatally shot the individual.225
The law enforcement officer’s body camera footage cleared him of
wrongdoing because it showed the individual wielded an ax and re-
fused to relinquish it even when asked to do so more than a dozen
times.226  Ultimately, the officer used deadly force when the individual
lunged at him with the ax.227  As demonstrated by the success of active
officer worn body camera programs, these programs have the poten-
tial to protect the people of Illinois as well as the dedicated law en-
forcement officers who serve Illinois communities.
C. Chicago’s Example Demonstrates Public Support for
Comprehensive Body Camera Programs
Communities in Illinois are demonstrating support for police re-
forms that go beyond the those set forth in the Act.  Following the
shooting death of Laquan McDonald by police officer Jason Van
Dyke in Chicago, the public voiced their support for widespread use
of officer-worn body cameras.228  As a result, Mayor Rahm Emanuel
and the City of Chicago responded by recognizing the importance of
mandatory and uniform use of officer-worn body cameras, and the
Chicago Police Department has begun implementing a comprehen-
sive, citywide, camera program, which is anticipated to be fully imple-
mented by the end of 2017.229  As this program rolls out in 2017, it will
serve as an example for other Illinois communities pursuing police
and community relations reforms.
V. CONCLUSION
Amending legislation so that it implements mandatory and uniform
use of officer-worn body cameras throughout Illinois will have a bene-
224. Video: Ala. Officer Cleared After Body Cam Shows Shooting, POLICEONE (Jan. 2, 2015),
https://www.policeone.com/police-products/body-cameras/articles/8068034-Video-Ala-officer-
cleared-after-body-cam-shows-shooting/.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. William Lee, Police Body Cameras To Be Implemented Citywide a Year Early: Officials,
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-body-cameras
-chicago-police-20161228-story.html.
229. Mayor Emanuel, Chicago Police Department Announce Expedited Expansion of Body
Worn Cameras Program, CITY CHI. (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/
mayor/press_room/press_releases/2016/december/Police_Expedite_Expansion_Body_Worn_
Cameras_Program.html (“[T]he Chicago Police Department (CPD) will expedite its body worn
camera expansion to every patrol officer in the City.”).
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ficial impact by improving citizen and law enforcement officer con-
duct, reducing the numbers of complaints against law enforcement
officers, saving tax dollars spent combatting allegations of misconduct,
and improving public compliance with the law.  Illinois can achieve
transparency in law enforcement by amending the Law Enforcement
Officer-Worn Body Camera Act to mandate universal use of officer-
worn body cameras in Illinois.
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